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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes different methods to aggregate heterogeneous policies for renewable energy. We 
compare time-varying indicators built using principal component analysis with average-based 
indicators. The main goal of the paper is to account for the evolution of both types of policy indicators 
with a set of common variables. Our empirical results are consistent with predictions of political-
economy models of environmental policies as lobbying, income and, to a less extent, inequality have 
expected effects on policy. The brown lobbying power, proxied by entry barriers in the energy sector, 
has negative influence on the policy indicators even when taking into account endogeneity in its effect. 
The results are also robust to dynamic panel specifications and to the exclusion of groups of countries. 
Interestingly, too, corruption has only an indirect effect on policy mediated by entry barriers, while the 
negative effect of inequality is much stronger for the richer countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Environmental problems typically call for government interventions to tackle market failures 
associated with pollution and investment in green technologies. The current consensus is that an 
appropriate combination of policies should be conceived to stimulate the search for new solutions 
rather than mere compliance with technological standards or fixed pollution targets. In this vein, recent 
policy strategy combines interventions to correct pollution externalities (e.g. carbon taxes) with 
policies to stimulate innovation (e.g. R&D subsidies). These sophisticated policy interventions 
characterize in particular the field of renewable energy, making any evaluation of the policy effort 
across countries and time problematic.  
Policies promoting renewable energy represent the most promising option to mitigate jointly GHG 
emissions and emerging oil scarcity, and can be evaluated using the rich dataset provided by the 
International Energy Agency, which contains time-varying information on Renewable Energy Policy 
(REP henceforth) for OECD countries. Figure 1 provides an overall picture of the evolution of policies 
in OECD countries, detailing the types of policies applied. The two oil crises of the 70s stimulated 
policy responses in almost all the developed countries, whereas an abrupt stop in the expansion of 
these policies occurred when oil prices started falling in the early 80s. A second wave of REP was 
implemented in the 90s in response to increasing concern for climate change mitigation. With regard 
to the policy adopted, certain cross-country regularities clearly emerge. A first phase focusing on 
RD&D (Research, Demonstration and Development) subsidies and grants is followed by a second 
phase characterized by a greater use of market-based instruments such as taxes, incentives and 
guaranteed prices and, more recently, tradable permits and renewable energy certificates. At the same 
time, diversification increased substantially as policies adopted earlier were often kept in use together 
with new ones. Diversification also makes it difficult to provide an aggregate measure of the effort by 
each country to favour the transition to renewable energy and to examine policy determinants 
systematically. In fact, aggregation of heterogeneous policies in a single indicator is not immediate 
because the available policies are measured either as 0-1 signal or on a continuous scale, e.g. Feed-in 
tariffs.  
                                                         [FIG.1 ABOUT HERE] 
The first goal of this paper is to build aggregate indicators of REP, which can enable rigorous 
evaluations of the policy impact on innovation and renewable energy diffusion. Using these indicators, 
our second goal is to test some predictions of political-economy models of environmental policies (e.g. 
Fredriksson 1997, Lopez and Mitra 2000). In these models, politicians maximize the probability of 
being re-elected by setting environmental policy so as to balance the interests of citizens and sector-
specific lobbies, including the lobby of environmental activists. The well-established result in both the 
empirical and theoretical literature is that the weighing factor assigned to these (potentially 
conflicting) interests depends upon the level of corruption, and this effect may be amplified or 
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mitigated depending on other institutional factors (e.g. Fredriksson and Svensson 2003, Damania et al. 
2003). Our empirical analysis shows that the impact of corruption on policy appears entirely mediated 
by its indirect effect on product market regulation, our proxy for incumbents’ lobbying power in the 
energy sector. Moreover, the degree of entry barriers is, together with a dummy for the first approval 
of the Kyoto protocol in 1998, the best predictor of REP. Finally, citizens’ preferences for a clean 
environment are better captured using both the first and the second moment of income distribution, 
consistently with models where the median voter decides on environmental policy (Magnani 2000, 
Kempf and Rossignol 2007). However, in line with models where environmental quality is a good 
occupying a higher position in the hierarchical scale (Vona and Patriarca 2011), the negative effect of 
inequality on environmental policies emerges only for the rich countries.  
The next section describes in greater detail the testable predictions derived from political economy 
models of environmental policy. This section will be followed by a section describing the 
methodology followed to build our dataset on REP and presenting the principal component analysis 
used to extract synthetic information from our heterogeneous set of policies. We compare the various 
countries’ policy efforts using both the principal component analysis indicators and a simpler average-
based indicator. Section 4 examines the determinants of the policy. The final section draws the 
conclusions and sets out some possible applications of our indexes to examine patterns of diffusion of 
renewable energy technologies.  
2. Determinants of Renewable Energy Policies 
     Policy plays a central role in fostering innovative responses to environmental problems. For 
renewable energy, technological learning is especially important to reduce the cost of energy 
production from renewable at the level of costs of polluting energy sources. Thus renewable energy 
policies are intrinsically related to innovation policies. Recent contributions emphasize this connection 
through the concept of ‘double externality’ on knowledge and pollution (Jaffe et al. 2005, Fisher and 
Newell 2008, Acemoglu et al. 2010). In this perspective, a policy targeted to environmental externality 
alone is likely to reduce firm’s competitiveness without fostering innovation, while combining it with 
a green R&D1 subsidy could be a way to meet the competitiveness and the sustainability targets alike.  
However, precise evaluation of the effect of renewable energy policies on innovation remains 
primarily an empirical issue. The effect of the policies considered in this paper has been addressed in 
three recent studies covering OECD countries for the period of mid-70s – mid-00s using the same 
dataset on energy policies, i.e. the one provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA). In general, 
policies seemed to have a strong effect on renewable energy technology, but heterogeneous across 
technologies and policy instruments (Johnstone et al. 2010) and generally weaker on per-capita 
                                                     
1. The need for subsidies and incentives is more pressing when green technologies display a strongly forward-bias 
profile, i.e. high initial investments in physical capital offset by lower variable costs, as for solar and wind energy. 
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investment in renewable capacity (Popp et al. 2011)2. However, the policy effect appears 
underestimated without taking into account the endogeneity of the policy support (Vona et al. 2012). 
In light of these findings, in particular, it may indeed prove useful to take a step back to look into the 
politico-economy determinants of renewable energy policy. The mainstream literature builds on the 
Grossman and Helpman model (1994), where multiple lobbies attempt to capture sector-specific 
policies by offering perspective bribes to politicians (Fredriksson 1997, Aidt 1998). As for the case of 
many environmental policies, the existing incumbents in the energy sector prefer less stringent policies 
and do the best they can to reduce policy stringency, while environmentalists support the approval of 
ambitious policies. The basic model’s prediction is that the extent to which the chosen level of 
environmental tax differs from the optimal Pigouvian tax depends on the lobbies ‘capacity to influence 
the policy. This, in turn, depends on the weighing factors assigned to the two objectives of aggregate 
social welfare, which mainly reflects concern for subsequent elections, and to the lobbies’ bribes, 
which reflect the lobbies’ capacity to influence specific policy such as environmental policy. The 
relative value assigned by politicians to the brown lobby bribe has been typically interpreted as 
dependent on the level of corruption, and the negative impact of corruption on environmental policy 
has been confirmed by substantial empirical research3. As for the green lobby, recent works by 
Fredriksson et al. (2007) and List and Sturm (2004) show that it has substantial influence on 
environmental policies. 
In the case of energy, first it is to be noted that the polluting sectors are expected to have a greater 
incentive to form lobbies in order to capture environmental policies (Damania and Fredriksson 2000). 
Fredriksson et al. (2004) provide empirical support for this prediction, showing that the effect of 
corruption, i.e. as proxy for lobbying power, on energy intensity is greater in the more energy-
intensive sectors.  More closely related to REP, case study evidence shows that the existing 
incumbents tend to oppose approval of ambitious renewable energy policies (e.g. Neuhoff 2005, 
Jacobsson and Bergek 2004, Nilsson et al. 2004, Lauber and Mez 2004). Since REP mainly entails 
subsidies and incentives, the opposition of existing lobbies is, in this case, related to technological 
                                                     
2. Using patent applications in many renewable technologies, Johnstone et al. (2010) show that guaranteed price 
schemes and investment incentives appear to play a major role in the early phase of technological development, 
whereas for relatively more mature technologies, e.g. wind, obligation and quantity-based instruments work 
better. This study also shows that the effect of energy prices, another dimension of the policy, is not statistically 
significant except in the case of solar energy. Popp et al. (2011) show that, among the policies considered, the 
dummy for the early ratification of the Kyoto protocol is the one that promoted the most per-capita investment in 
renewable capacity. Again, however, the effect of the policies is highly heterogeneous across renewable 
technologies, being much stronger for biomasses, waste and wind. 
3. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) extend the Helpman and Grossman (1994) and Fredriksson (1997) models to 
include political instability as well. Their model shows that the effect of corruption decreases when political 
instability increases as incumbent officeholders can less credibly commit to a policy. This prediction is 
confirmed in their empirical analysis of the stringency of environmental regulation in agriculture. Other aspects 
of the impact corruption on environmental policies are considered in variants of the same models and tested 
empirically by Fredriksson et al. (2004), who consider multiple lobbies and their organization costs, Fredriksson 
and Vollebergh (2009), showing that the effect of corruption is lower in federal systems, and Damania et al. 
(2003), where the effect of corruption greatly depends on the degree of trade openness. 
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comparative advantages rather than to the costs of complying with regulations. In fact, whereas the 
production of energy from renewable sources is decentralized in small-medium sized units, the 
competences of the existing incumbents are tied to large scale plants using coal, nuclear or gas as 
primary energy inputs. Moreover, the high sunk costs of large-scale generation further exacerbate the 
lock-in of incumbents and should fuel their political opposition to the distributed generation paradigm. 
Therefore, unlike models where deviations from the optimal taxation depend on the politicians’ 
willingness to accept bribes, the bias in the politicians’ behavior is, we hold, to be interpreted as 
depending upon the potential size of the bribe, which is proportional to the monopolistic rents of the 
energy lobby. 
Following on this argument, the recent liberalization of energy markets should have reduced the 
incumbents’ opposition, favoring the adoption of ambitious renewable energy policies. Clearly, one 
should also expect a stronger effect of entry barriers where corruption levels are high. However, we 
will show that, rather than being synergetic, the effect of corruption on policy is fully mediated by the 
indirect effect on entry barriers. 
Renewable energy policies are also affected by social welfare considerations and depend on the 
aggregation of citizens’ preferences. Since environmental quality is a normal good4, the wealthier 
households demand more stringent environmental policies to satisfy it – a prediction that is consistent 
with the empirical evidence at both the micro and the macro level (Arrow et al. 1995, Diekmann and 
Franzen 1999, Dasgupta et al. 2001, Esty and Porter 2005, Oecd 20085). The second moment of 
income distribution also matters, as recent theoretical and empirical studies have shown6. The effect of 
inequality hinges upon the fact that, given the level of per capita income, a lower level of inequality 
implies a richer median voter and so greater support for ambitious policies.  
In sum, both socio-economic and institutional factors affect REP, suggesting that a hybrid political 
economy model is the most appropriate to account for REP determinants. In particular, our predictions 
based on perusal of the literature are that both higher entry barriers and inequality should reduce 
                                                     
4. Actually, this effect is reinforced if environmental quality is a good hierarchically higher in the scale. The idea 
is that "concern(s) for quality-of-life issues, such as free of speech, liberty and environmental protection... arise 
only after individuals have met their more basic materialist needs for food, shelter, and safety" (Gelissen 2007, p. 
393, see also Inglehart 1995). 
5. At the micro level, several studies have also shown that wealthier and more educated households are generally 
more willing to pay higher prices for renewable energy (Roe et al. 2001, Wiser 2007) and to participate 
voluntarily in clean energy programs (Rose et al. 2002, Kotchen and Moore 2007, Kotchen 2010).  
6. Magnani (2000) shows that, given the level of per capita income, inequality and expenditures on public goods 
are negatively correlated, as wealthier households are more willing to contribute to the provision of public goods 
than poor ones. Eriksson and Persson (2003) also derive a partial negative inequality-pollution relationship in a 
political-economy model where heterogeneous agents decide upon the optimal level of pollution control under 
the assumption that wealthier individuals are less affected by pollution. Kempf and Rossignol (2007) obtain a 
similar result in a model where a dynamic trade-off between growth and environmental quality is explicitly 
considered. McAusland and Carol (2003) derives quite different implications and shows that the effect of 
inequality depends on both trade openness and the distributions of polluting- and clean-factor endowments. 
Empirical evidence in Magnani (2000) and Vona and Patriarca (2011) confirms that inequality negatively affects 
public investment in green R&D.  
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policy intensity, while higher income should increase it. To test the effects of these factors rigorously, 
it is crucial to build aggregate indicators of REP indicators. Moreover, the existing studies focus 
mainly on cross-sectional analysis of environmental policy, neglecting the time dimension, an 
exception being Fredriksson et al. 2004, which attempts to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing 
the issue of policy determinants in a dynamic panel dataset.  
Aggregate Indicators of Policy for Renewable Energy 
Building the Policy Indicators 
The dataset made available by the IEA contains detailed country fact sheets to construct dummy 
variables reflecting the adoption time of selected REP for most OECD countries7. A drawback of this 
dataset is that it provides information on the year of adoption, but does not specify the degree of 
intensity of the policy adopted. We hence integrate this information using other data sources in all 
those cases for which policies measured on a continuous scale are available. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is possible for the following three policy instruments: public renewable R&D 
expenditure, feed-in tariff schemes and Renewable Energy certificates8. Information on the first is also 
available in the joint IEA-Oecd dataset9, whereas the main references for feed-in tariff are two reports 
drawn up by IEA (2004) and Cerveny and Resch (1998), plus some country specific sources10.Our 
measure of the stringency of REC targets is the variable constructed by Johnstone et. al. (2010), which 
reflects share of electricity that must be generated by renewables or covered with an REC. 
Johnstone et al. (2010) place particular emphasis on the role of these continuous policy variables for 
empirical analysis of the determinants of renewable energy innovation and diffusion. However, 
construction of a synthetic indicator based on these specific REP alone may be misleading for several 
reasons. Firstly, some countries may be underrepresented if they decide not to adopt guaranteed price 
schemes or REC targets, but to rely on other instruments for which we have only binary information11. 
                                                     
7. http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=re 
8. Through guaranteed price schemes, the energy authority obliges energy distributors to feed in the production 
of renewable energy at fixed prices varying according to the various sources (wind, solar, waste..). This system 
has become widespread in many countries, including Germany, Spain and Denmark, and is considered one the 
main factors in the development of renewable technologies, especially thanks to the advantage of reducing 
uncertainty, offering investors long-term security (Reiche et. al., 2002). REC, on the other hand, consists of 
tradable financial assets, issued by the regulating authority, which certify the production of renewable energy 
and can be traded among the actors involved. Along with the creation of a certificate scheme, more generally a 
separate market is established where producers can trade the certificates, creating certificate “supply”, while the 
demand depends on political choices. The price of the certificate is determined through relative trading between 
the retailers. The first phase of implementation of REC systems in Europe dates back to the beginning of the 
2000s, when many European countries experimented with this instrument in order to meet the targets set by 
Directive 2001/77/CE.  
9. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=767491 
10. http://www.ren21.net/ and http://www.res-legal.de. 
11. An important example is Japan, which during the period analyzed did not adopt any feed-in tariff schemes, 
but adopted many other REPs, and was the country with the largest energy RD&D budget of the OECD 
countries (about 3.4 billion dollars) in 2001. Moreover, Japan widely adopted other market-based instruments 
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Secondly, these three policies have often been adopted in recent years, so relying on them to 
characterize the long-term evolution of policy effort could prove misleading12. Thirdly, the complete 
exclusion of the other instruments,  e.g. tax and investment incentives (see table 1), would offer a 
rather incomplete picture of the overall policy effort since some of these policies are important to spur 
renewable energy technology.  
On the other hand, with policy dummies it is possible to measure policy effort from a different angle. 
An indicator based on adoption dummies appears to reflect more closely the overall intention of the 
government to pursue REP or, more generally, its commitment towards renewable energy. Dummy 
variables are available for many policies: tax, investment incentives, Obligations, voluntary 
agreements and European directives. Table 1 in the appendix offers a detailed explanation of each 
policy, including the continuous ones. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Overall, the appropriate policy index should include both the signaling effect of policy dummies and 
the stringency of continuous policies. Previous research on aggregate policy indicators attempts to deal 
with heterogeneous information in a variety of ways. Nicolli et al. (2012) builds an aggregate indicator 
as the average of a set of policy adoption dummies, sacrificing  stringency (available only for a small 
subset of instruments) for the sake of completeness. Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009) weigh policy signals 
to account for the cross-country differences in the intensity of the main policy instrument for which 
they have quantitative information, i.e.  landfill taxes13. Using survey data, Dasgupta et al. (2001) 
assigns weights to each policy on a Likert scale, built converting into numeric values the answers 
given to specific questions in the survey. In general, respondents were asked to grade each answer 
“high” (2), “medium” (1) or “low” (0) according to their relative perceptions of the intensity of 
regulation. Also using survey-based data, Esty and Porter (2005) summarizes several policy indicators 
through common factor analysis in order to collapse the huge set of indicators into two main ones14.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
like: voluntary agreement between public and private sector; Capital grants, investment incentive for renewable 
energy installation and production standards. The same holds for Canada and Norway. 
12. Especially for RECs, and in some cases also for feed-in tariff schemes, the adoption time is around year 
2000, particularly in Europe, where the 2001 EU directive has established precise targets for the share of RES 
electricity in each EU Member State's supply. As a result an indicator based on this information alone can either 
present too many zeros or be composed by only on a single variable, e.g. public R&D. Identifying the factor 
affecting the adoption time of these policies represents an interesting extension of our analysis, but is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
13. Starting from the available country fact sheet on waste they differentiated between “strategy” and “effective 
policy”, to which were assigned weights equal to 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, they weighted the landfill tax 
dummy variable in accordance with the stringency of the instrument.  
14. While the indicator of Dasgupta et al. (2001) includes both objective policy measures and self-reported data 
based on a survey conducted by the United Nations, the indicator of Esty and Porter (2005) uses only the self-
reported perception of the stringency of environmental regulation in a survey conducted on managers and policy-
makers. The data used by Esty and Porter (2005) are collected within the Environmental Sustainability Index 
(ESI) project, based on joint collaboration between the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Politics, Center 
for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University and the World Economic Forum. 
For details: http://www.yale.edu/esi/ and http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness. 
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Given the lack of consensus on the appropriate way to aggregate heterogeneous policies, we propose 
both methods based on simpler average-based indexes and principal component analysis. With regard 
to the former method, we propose two indicators. As in Nicolli et al. (2012), the first is the average 
value of the different policy dummies (COM_POL). The second, instead, considers only the three 
policies for which we have intensity measures, standardizes them and then takes the unweighted 
average (CONT_POL). These two indexes reflect, respectively, the overall policy commitment and the 
intensity of the most relevant policy instruments. They will be used to check the robustness of the 
results obtained from the principal component analysis indicators. 
Principal component analysis is interesting for its ability to extract a small number of sub-indexes 
(called principal components) from a wide set of variables. The first principal component is the linear 
combination of the original variables that exhibits the greatest possible variance. In our specific case, 
we expect the first component to account for the maximum amount of variation of information in the 
original set of policy proxies. With sequential application of the technique it is possible to identify a 
second linear combination a second linear combination of the original variables that explain the 
greater share of the residual variance, and so on15. It is to be noted that every component is orthogonal 
to all the others, and consequently is expected to reflect a different dimension of the original set of 
variables. To build aggregate indicators, the general rule of thumb is to use only those components that 
account for a sufficient amount of variance, i.e. generally associated with an eigenvalue greater than 1. 
To overcome the lack of robustness and accountability of which this technique is usually accused, we 
constructed three different indicators using principal component analysis16. Our favorite indicator 
considers  the average level of the feed-in tariff (FACT_AV_FEEDIN). The second includes the level 
of the feed-in tariff only for technologies that are more promising and less dependent on resource 
endowments, i.e. solar, wind, biomass, waste (FACT_SP_FEED). The third combines the previous 
two by including the average level of feed-in and dummies for the adoption of feed-in for waste, solar, 
wind and biomass (FACT_MIX_FEED). Note that, for feed-in tariffs, dummies may capture policy 
intensity better than feed-in levels since the latter have been adjusted downward in countries that 
adopted it earlier. Also for the other two variables measured on a continuous scale, i.e. REC and R&D, 
we include both the signal and the intensity to build this indicator. For all these indicators, the analysis 
generally produces between three and four relevant principal components (i.e. with associated 
eigenvalue>1) that have been used to build a single indicator as the simple average of the three 
                                                     
15. Principal components are generally normalized, and have mean equal to zero and variance equal to one, 
which provide a better interpretation of the resulting value, especially when employed in sequent analysis. The 
components obtained in the analysis are generally rotated to produce more readily interpretable results. The 
tables presented below refer to an orthogonal (VERIMAX) rotation, but also oblique rotation, not presented in 
the paper, yields similar results. 
16. A major concern is that new factors are built using constant weights that exploit both the cross-country and 
the time variability. Clearly, building time-specific weight(s?) would be more accurate, but at the cost that 
interpretation of each factor would change over time. So, for instance, the first factor turns out to be composed 
mainly of feed-in tariffs for the first two decades and by REC afterwards. Bearing this in mind, we prefer to 
build factors using time-invariant weights.  
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components. A brief description of the results of the principal component analysis is presented in the 
following section.  
Descriptive evidence 
Tables 2 to 4 summarize in detail which are the main variables that ‘load’ each relevant principal 
component used in the three main indicators. This step is important to give clear meaning to each 
principal component as it is usually desirable for variables showing greater similarity to be clustered in 
the same component. For instance, in the path-breaking labour economics paper of Autor et al. (2003) 
the two relevant dimensions to cluster several job tasks were cognitive/non-cognitive and routine/non-
routine. Here, it is the broad type of policy intervention that matters: price-based (of which purely 
fiscal instruments is a sub-category), quantity-based and innovation-oriented. Supporting our 
methodological choice, the generated principal components have a clear interpretation and similar 
variables are usually clustered together. The component with the highest explanatory power, the first, 
is mainly a combination of price-based policies17. However, unlike our favorite indicator 
(FACT_AV_FEED), where the first PC contains all price-based policies, feed-in tariffs remain the 
main policy correlated with the first principal component for the other two indicators, whereas fiscal 
policies influence the second (resp. third) component for FACT_SP_FEED (resp. FACT_MIX_FEED). 
The second principal component is a combination of quantity-based instrument for FACT_MIX_FEED 
and FACT_AV_FEED. For FACT_SP_FEED, the third is mainly correlated with REC and EU 2001 
directive while obligations equally load on the second and the third. The last principal component in 
terms of explanatory power is always strongly correlated with innovation oriented policies (i.e. R&D 
intensity and dummies). Finally, the differences among the three indicators are small, as can be seen in 
the correlations set out in table 5. However, these differences are statistically significant motivating 
the use of all indicators to validate our results. 
[TABLES 2-5 ABOUT HERE] 
The evolution of FACT_AV_FEED is shown in Figure2 for selected years. As expected, 
FACT_AV_FEED displays a monotonically increasing pattern for almost all countries, with the 
exceptions of Switzerland and Greece which experience a small decline in year 2005 with respect to 
1995. The indicator is fairly stable in most countries up to the beginning of the 90s, after which 
particularly large increases are observed in the last few decades. Figures 3 and 4 enable comparison of 
FACT_AV_FEED with the two average based indicators (COM_POL, CONT_POL). Although they 
reflect different aspects of the policy support, the overall trends for these indicators are fairly similar 
across countries and consistently increasing over time. Denmark represents, however, an important 
exception. Its high value in both average feed-in level and REC targets renders it an outlier in those 
indicators that weight these variables more. The transition economies are generally those with lower 
                                                     
17. In all three cases, the first principal component accounts for around 40% of the total policy variance, the 
second slightly more than 10% and the third and the fourth slightly less than 10%. 
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policy levels showing no growth together with Greece and New Zealand. The country ranking 
presented in table 6 is fairly well preserved across the indicators. There are, however, some 
discrepancies, which are due in certain countries like Japan, Norway and Canada to the absence of a 
national feed-in tariff scheme (which accounts for a third of the total variability of CONT_POL and 
has a high loading in the principal component), while cases like the Netherlands and Sweden have a 
better ranking in indicators based on continuous variables thanks to their higher than average level of 
REC target and public expenditure in R&D. These considerations also explain the correlation matrixes 
presented in tables 7-9, which, although confirming the high correlation among the three indicators, 
well highlight the differences between CONT_POL and COM_POL.  
[FIGURES 2-4 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLES 6-9 ABOUT HERE] 
Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of the Policy 
Explanatory Variables 
The review in section 2 identifies three main determinants of REP: GDP per capita (GDP_pc), income 
inequality (INEQ) and market structure. For the latter two, we use standard data sources (see the 
appendix). For the former, we use the index of Product Market Regulation (PMR) in the energy sector 
provided by the Oecd18. This index is also built using common factor analysis by combining objective 
sector-specific policies and regulation from different data sources19.The PMR index for electricity and 
gas aggregates three sub-indexes ranging from 0 to 6 (maximum anti-competitive regulation). The first 
is ownership, which assumes five values: private (=0), mostly private, mixed, mostly public and public 
(=6).The second is an index of entry barriers that use information on third party access to the grid 
(regulated=0, negotiated, no access=6) and minimum consumer size to choose supplier freely (from 
‘no threshold=0’ to ‘no choice=6’). The third component is vertical integration ranging from 
unbundling (=0) to full integration (=6). Access to each sub-index allows for evaluation of the 
importance of each particular aspect of the liberalization process on the energy market. Figure9 
displays the evolution of PMR for selected countries. A widespread reduction of PMR occurs as from 
the early 90s in parallel with a general process of deregulation in many markets. For our purposes, it is 
worth noting that the PMR indicator has four main advantages over alternative proxies of market 
power: exogeneity, reliability (Conway and Nicoletti 2006, Nicoletti and Pryor 2006) and the fact that 
it is time-varying and based on objective measures of regulation. 
                                                     
18. The sectors of interest are those of electricity (ISIC 4010) and, to a lesser extent, Gas (ISIC 4020). 
19. The data sources the privatization Barometer of the Fondazione Enrico Mattei, the Integrated data Base of 
the World Trade Organization and interviews with civil servants in particular areas. For details on the 
construction of the index and the weighting scheme see, e.g., Conway et al. (2005). The cross-country rankings 
of the PMR indicator appears substantially unchanged when using different specifications of the weighting 
scheme (Conway and Nicoletti 2006) and is in line with rankings derived from other indicators of market 
competition (Nicoletti and Pryor 2006).  
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To account for the influence of international factors on country’s policies, we include a dummy equal 
to 1 as for the year when the Kyoto protocol was first ratified (in 1998). Previous studies show that the 
Kyoto dummy has a strong effect on investment in renewable capacity and technology diffusion (Popp 
et al. 2011, Johnstone et al. 2010).  Interestingly, we show here that this effect is partially mediated by 
an inducement effect on REP at the national level. Energy prices (ENERGY) are also considered in 
the set of explanatory variables because REPs are usually charged to consumers in terms of higher 
prices (e.g. the case of feed-in tariff) or energy taxes are jointly decided with policies20. In contrast 
with basic theoretical predictions, ENERGY and PMR are not correlated in our sample, so the 
inclusion of both does not create problems of interpretation. The same lack of correlation can be 
observed between GINI and GDP_pc, probably because of the substantial homogeneity of the country 
sample. A further aspect of the energy market is captured by a dummy equal to 1 if the country had a 
substantial share of energy from DG before the liberalization process started (see table 10). Since 
renewable energy involves decentralized energy production, countries with a greater share of DG have 
not only a comparative advantage in developing renewable energy technology (Vona et al. 2012), but 
also DG producers are likely to push for more ambitious REC to further exploit this advantage. 
Finally, the share of green deputies in the parliament captures both people’s preferences for 
environmental quality and a political voice for environmental issues, i.e. the green lobby21. Also 
corruption (CORR) is on the whole insignificant and so not included, but in some specifications. As 
will be clearer below, CORR represents a suitable instrument for PMR. Corruption data are taken from 
the transparency Index (transparency international, 1996)22. 
The resulting dataset is a fairly balanced dynamic panel of OECD countries for the period 1970 (but 
data on PMR are available from 1975) to 2005. Turkey and Mexico are excluded in main regressions 
as they are outliers in GDP_pc, while for the Slovak Republic and Czech Republic we have data on 
income only as from 1989. Korea is also excluded due to missing data on INEQ. Finally, note that 
missing values for PMR, GREEN and ENERGY are concentrated in particular in the middle-income 
and transition countries. Therefore, differences in results across specifications may be partially related 
to this bias in the data availability. In Table 11 of the appendix, data sources and basic descriptive for 
each variable are set out. 
                                                     
20. The energy price variable has many missing values, particularly in Sweden, Belgium, Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic. In the first two cases they were mainly internal values in the time series, which have been 
imputed as the average of the two adjacent years. For the other two countries this was not always the case and 
we preferred not to reconstruct the series before 1989 due to extensive lack of data. 
21. Estimated coefficients associated with other political factors such as ‘share of deputies in other countries’, 
‘government composition’, ‘government instability’ or ‘government change’ are unstable across indicators. The 
same holds for other factors affecting preferences for a cleaner environment such as the share of women in 
parliament (normally women are more pro-environment) and the share of over-65-year-olds in the population 
(normally older people are less environment-friendly). Finally, Fredriksson et al. (2007) uses the per capita 
number of green NGOs as proxy for green lobbies. Here this time-invariant variable does not capture any 
significant effect. Results are available upon request 
22. As in Friedrikson and Vollebergh (2009), the existing data have been interpolated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. Data for Corruption are only available as from year 1980 and we decided to not interpolate backward. 
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[TABLES 10-11 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURES 5-6 ABOUT HERE] 
Econometric Specification  
We use standard panel data techniques to estimates the impact of our variables of interest on policy 
indicators. More precisely: 
 
, 
 
where Xs are our covariates, ti area specific time trends,  country effects and is a purely random 
effect. As usual in cross-country panel data regressions, the critical choice is between Random (RE) 
and Fixed Effect (FE) model. The first is consistent but efficient only if country-specific effects are 
uncorrelated with the covariates, which is unlikely to occur when there are omitted variables. The FE 
model, instead, tends to wipe out all the cross-country variability, which is absorbed by country 
dummies; thereby efficiency is largely reduced. The Hausman test allows for discrimination between 
the two models. Specifically, if the null hypothesis is not rejected, the two models deliver similar 
results and the RE model is also consistent. In cross-country regressions, a standard way of solving the 
consistency-efficiency trade-off consists in including fixed effects for homogeneous geographical 
areas, e.g. the Scandinavian countries, in an RE model (e.g. Caselli and Coleman 2001). This is the 
route followed in this paper. However, it will be shown that both FE and RE estimates provide quite 
similar coefficients, suggesting that the trade-off is less severe in our case. 
The relationship between the degree of entry barrier and environmental policies may be plagued by 
reverse causality and omitted variable bias. With regard to the former, a self-reinforcing mechanism 
can emerge because lowering entry barriers not only decreases the lobbying power of incumbents, but 
also strengthens new green players that will support more ambitious policies later on. Furthermore, 
technological improvements may represent an indirect source of endogeneity, as suggested by the 
seminal paper by Downing and White (1986). Omitted variable bias can be an issue here as we cannot 
account for all the factors that affect lobbying efforts such as coordination costs23. For instance, 
lobbies can keep affecting energy policy if existing incumbents remain strong after liberalization 
occurs. We hence use our time varying measure of corruption as an instrument for the degree of PMR. 
The idea that corruption dampers the process of liberalization is in line with the previous use of 
corruption as a proxy for the lobbies’ capacity to affect environmental policy (e.g. Fredriksson and 
Svensson 2003). A highly positive correlation between PMR and CORR suggests that CORR is a good 
candidate to instrument PMR.  
                                                     
23. Unlike Fredriksson et al. (2004), we cannot use the sector size as a proxy for coordination costs that reduce 
the probability of forming a lobby. In fact, we cannot control for sources of sector-level variability. 
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Three caveats are in order to detail our empirical strategy further. First, lagged GDP_pc is included to 
reduce the possible unobservable correlation between the policy indicators and income. Secondly, we 
always compute cluster-robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Third, 
standard tests for auto-correlation of the residuals do not reject the null hypothesis of absence of auto-
correlation. We check the robustness of our results using the LSDV bias-correction procedure for 
dynamic panel developed in Nickell (1981), and Kiviet (1995, 1999). This estimator generally 
outperforms IV and GMM estimators in all these contexts, like the present one, in which N is small 
and T is long (Judson and Owen, 1999). 
Results 
In the following tables, we present the main results for each indicator. We focus mainly on the result 
on indicators built using principal component analysis. To highlight differences across indicators, we 
present slightly different specifications that enable us to stress those aspects which are more important 
for a given indicator. Another important caveat is that all the indicators are normalized to ease 
comparison of the estimated effects24. 
Table 12 presents the result for our favorite FACT_AV_FEED indicator. The baseline specification of 
model I shows that GDP_pc, INEQ and Kyoto25 are all statistically significant with the expected signs, 
whereas GREEN is not significant but has the expected positive effect. The second specification also 
includes PMR which, as expected, negatively influences the policy.  Between the RE model 
augmented with area dummies and the FE one, the difference is generally negligible, as is evident 
comparing model II (RE) and II (FE). In this case, even if the Hausman test usually rejects the null 
hypothesis that the RE model is also consistent, Wooldridge (2010) suggests focusing on the RE 
model. When energy prices and the dummy for DG are also included (model III), the results do not 
change except for GDP_pc, which turns out to be statistically insignificant. The effect of ENERGY is 
statistically significant, unlike that of the DG dummy. As shown in model IV, the dummy for DG has 
a significant effect only when combined in interaction with PMR26. In particular, the process of 
liberalization has a lower impact on the policy support in countries with initially more developed DG 
system. Model V and VI present our favorite specifications with the PMR indicator split in its three 
sub-indices. Of those sub-indices, only entry barriers significantly affect policy support. Unlike model 
III, the dummy for DG now has the expected positive impact on the policy. Moreover, the inclusion of 
area-specific time trend kills the effect of ENERGY, GDP_pc and, to a lesser extent, INEQ27. These 
                                                     
24. Clearly, we checked that this manipulation of the data does not affect our results. 
25. Nothing changes in our results by using the exact time of ratification for each country rather than the Kyoto 
dummy. 
26. We also checked the effect of other interaction terms (PMR with instability or PMR with corruption), but 
find no support for it. Results are available upon request. 
27. Results available upon request show that the inclusion of corruption, share of tertiary graduates (the only one 
that is statistically significant with the expected sign), political instability (measured as five-year moving average 
The Evolution of Renewable Energy Policy in OECD Countries: aggregate indicators and determinants 
 
 15
results are fully confirmed when using FACT_MIX_FEED (Table 13) and FACT_SP_FEED 
(available upon request). The only significant differences between Table 12 and 13 regard the 
magnitude of the effects: the estimated coefficient of INEQ almost halves with FACT_MIX_FEED 
but remains significant at cut-off 85%; the effect of GDP_pc is instead larger by around 1/4-1/3; on 
the other hand, that of PMR and of entry barrier is smaller than for FACT_AV_FEED. 
Also for policy commitment indicator, COM_POL, the difference between the RE model augmented 
with area dummy and the FE model is negligible (see Model I (RE) and I (FE) in table 14), so we 
favor the RE model with area dummies. Concerning the estimated coefficients, the effect of GDP_pc 
tends to be substantially stronger than for previous indicators. Compared to FACT_AV_FEED, the 
impact of GDP_pc is 76% higher in model II and 66% higher in model V. The effect of the Kyoto 
dummy and the ENERGY prices also tends to be greater using COM_POL, but the differences are less 
substantial. 
Four more notable differences emerge from Table 14 with respect to indicators built using principal 
component analysis. First, INEQ is not significant and does not even have the expected negative sign. 
Secondly, the effect of GREEN is statistically significant across most specifications. Third, the 
inclusion of energy price does not wipe out the effect of GDP_pc. Fourth, PMR has the expected sign, 
but the associated coefficient is not statistically significant. However, when looking at single 
components of the PMR index, this effect primarily masks a significantly negative effect of entry 
barriers counterbalanced by a significantly positive effect of vertical integrated utilities. These 
findings on PMR sub-indices remain robust to the inclusion of area trends, while the coefficients of 
GDP_pc and GREEN become insignificant. Finally, in model VI’, additional socio-political variables 
all have the expected sign but only the share of graduates has a statistically significant effect. 
Our explanatory variables have a remarkably smaller explanatory power in regressions with the 
indicator CONT_POL. This result depends on the fact that the policies included in CONT_POL–i.e. 
REC, average feed-in and R&D per capita—have been implemented quite recently in many countries. 
Besides, the policy intensity seems unrelated to the factors affecting the timing of adoption. The case 
of feed-in tariffs helps understand this missing relationship: countries adopting feed-in early generally 
decrease the level of guaranteed prices after an initial phase of technological and consumer learning28. 
Table 15 shows that the effects of GREEN and, especially, of GDP_pc are weak and often 
insignificant. In turn, INEQ, ENERGY and PMR continue to show the same impacts. As before, the 
effect of PMR is lower in countries with a well-established DG system and mainly driven by entry 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of government changes characterized by a significant ideological gap) and women’s share in parliament does not 
contribute to our understanding of REP. 
28. Even if our cross-country variability in the timing of adoption of continuous policies is limited, we have tried 
to estimate a Cox proportional hazard rate model to see more rigorously whether our main variables affect the 
time of adoption. In fact, the probability of the CONT_POL being adopted earlier increases in the initial level of 
GDP_pc and decreases in the level of Corruption. However, we prefer not to include this analysis as we believe 
that the very limited variability of our dependent variable reduces the reliability of these results.  
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barriers. These findings are robust to the inclusion of a simple time trend, but less so to the inclusion 
of area specific trends (available upon request). Finally, model I’ shows that CORR is significant at 
90% level in regressions without PMR. 
[TABLES 12-15 ABOUT HERE] 
Robustness 
A first robustness exercise consists in addressing the possible endogeneity in the effect of PMR. We 
use Corruption as main exclusion restriction together with the share of members of parliament of 
right-wing parties and the share of highly educated people in the population. Both these factors should 
positively affect liberalization: 1. Right wing members of parliament usually promote market 
deregulation, 2. Highly educated workers benefit most from adoption of new technologies brought 
about by reductions in entry barriers. Table 16 presents results for the two main principal component-
based indicators: FACT_AV_FEEDIN and FACT_MIX_FEED. The chosen instruments all have the 
expected sign (results available on request), a high explanatory power (the F-test for the first stage 
well-above the usual cut-off level of 10) and appear truly exogenous (see Hansen tests). The bias in 
the estimates is negligible for FACT_AV and the magnitude of the effect seems only slightly 
overestimated in RE regressions with area dummies. With regard to FACT_MIX_FEED, the 
estimation bias is now negative and slightly larger, amounting to roughly 15%. More in general, the 
most interesting result of this exercise is that the effect of corruption on policy intensity is fully 
mediated by its indirect effect on the PMR index. This result is particularly evident looking at the 
results of the just-identified GMM estimate (column 2 and 4 of Table 16).  
The last four columns of Table 16 present the results of a dynamic panel model specification where 
the lagged dependent variable is included to address problems raised by autocorrelation in the 
residuals. The results for the INEQ and PMR remain robust for our favorite FACT_AV_FEEDIN 
indicator, even if the magnitude of the effects is substantially reduced, while GDP_pc turns out to be 
statistically insignificant. However, if we estimate the baseline RE model with area dummy model of 
Table 12 model II for years before 1985 (resp. 1980) only, the effect of GDP_pc increases from .043 
to .114 (resp. 141). Since, as is well known, the results of dynamic panel models are highly sensitive 
to initial conditions on the dependent variables (Blundell and Bond 1998), it appears that income 
directly affects the initial adoption of REP and that its subsequent impact is fully captured by the 
positive feedback from the past to present policies. Similar results hold for FACT_MIX_FEED, but 
now Kyoto and GREEN are always statistically significant. With respect to principal component-
based indicators, the dynamic specification affects less our results for COM_POL and CONT_POL. 
Interestingly, the effect of the GREEN lobby becomes much stronger both in the GMM and in the 
dynamic specification – a result deserving further investigation.  
As final exercise, we check robustness for omission of group of countries. Since our panel data are 
slightly unbalanced and we cannot test the effect of PMR and GREEN for all countries, we check our 
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results in a basic specification with only Kyoto, GDP_pc and INEQ also including Mexico and Turkey 
(Table 17). Then, while keeping Mexico and Turkey, we add PMR (Table 18). Table 17 shows that the 
Scandinavian countries and even more the USA drive the results for inequality. In turn, the effect of 
GDP_pc is slightly stronger when rich Anglo-Saxon and central European countries are excluded. 
Table 18 confirms the key role of the Scandinavian countries in accounting for the magnitude of the 
inequality coefficient, but this impact remains significant across specifications. The Scandinavian 
countries also inflate the size of the PMR coefficient, while Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European 
countries tend to squeeze it. As a general pattern, the effect of inequality tends to be slightly stronger 
when rich countries only are considered, while the opposite seems to occur for the effect of GDP_pc. 
This interpretation is more evident looking at Table 19, where we estimate the baseline RE model with 
area dummies with an interaction GDP_pc*INEQ. This finding on the reversal of the inequality effect 
depending on per capita income is in line with the theoretical and empirical findings of Vona and 
Patriarca (2011) for green technology, which could easily be translated into a political economy 
theoretical framework29. 
[TABLES 16-19 ABOUT HERE] 
Conclusions 
This paper proposes principal component analysis to aggregate heterogeneous policies targeted at 
promoting renewable energy. We compare the indicators built using this technique with simpler 
average-based indicators. In doing this, we implicitly test whether it is possible to identify a set of 
variables able to account for the evolution of both types of indicators. We draw inspiration from 
political economy models of environmental policies and adapt predictions of these models to the case 
of REP. Our main result is that three main variables common to all indicators can be identified: per 
capita income, Kyoto and entry barriers. The first reflects a classical preference effect, the second the 
role of international cooperation and the third the one of energy lobbies. Of the components of the 
PMR index, entry barrier fully captures the energy lobby’s opposition against REP. Results remain 
robust when instrumenting market regulation and in more demanding dynamic panel specifications. 
Here, the estimated effects are generally mitigated but less so by taking into account the effect of our 
relevant variables on the initial level of the dependent variable (especially for GDP_pc). Finally, the 
effect of the green lobby increases substantially in the dynamic panel specification.  
Another important result is that the second moment of the income distribution matters in capturing 
aggregate preferences for environmental quality, but only for indicators using both quantitative policy 
measures and policy signals. In line with previous research (Vona and Patriarca 2011), the effect of 
inequality appears stronger the richer the countries considered, while the opposite occurs for the effect 
                                                     
29. Vona and Patriarca (2011) show that, with a minimum of non-homotheticity in the preferences for 
environmental quality, the negative effect of inequality on the demand for the green good occurs only for high 
levels of income per capita.  
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of GDP_pc. In particular, lowering inequality increases public support for more ambitious REP when 
basic needs have been met. All together, these results suggest that a hybrid political-economy model 
of environmental policy, where both competition and lobbying power are important, offers the most 
accurate explanation of policy determinants. Recent theoretical developments go in this direction and 
consider more closely both aspects of the political process (e.g. Wilson and Damania 2003). 
Except in a few cases, we do not observe the expected theoretical effect of corruption on policy. 
However, corruption keeps having an effect on policy that is fully mediated by its indirect effect on 
PMR. This result is important for future and on-going research, where we will analyze the 
effectiveness of our policy indicators on the diffusion and the development of renewable energy 
technologies. In particular, the influence that stronger green firms have on the renewable energy policy 
can be an important source of reverse causality affecting the relationship between policy and 
renewable energy innovation. 
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Figure 1. Patterns of policy adoption in selected OECD countries 
 
 
Source: IEA (2004), as in Johnstone et. al. (2009). AUS Australia, C Canada, FIFinland, GR Greece, ITA Italy, L Luxembourg, NO Norway, SW Sweden, UK United Kingdom, A Austria, CZ 
Czech Rep., F France, H Hungary, J Japan, NE Netherlands, P Portugal, CH Switzerland, US United States,B Belgium, DK Denmark, DE Germany, IR Ireland, NZ New Zealand, E Spain, T Turkey  
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Table 1. Summary of the main Policies 
Instrument Brief explanation Variable Construction Source 
Investment incentives Capital Grants and all other measures aimed at reducing the capital cost of adopting 
renewable energy technologies. May also take the form of third party financial 
arrangements, where central governments assume part of the risk or provide low interest rate 
on loans. They are generally provided by State budgets. 
Dummy Variable International Energy Agency 
Tax Measure Economic instruments used either to encourage production or discourage consumption. They 
may have the form of investment tax credit or property tax exemptions, in order to reduce 
tax payments for project owner. An example is the US production Tax credit for wind 
(1992). Excises are not directly accounted here unless they were explicitly created to 
promote renewables (for example excise tax exemptions). 
Dummy Variable International Energy Agency 
Incentive tariff Price systems that guarantee above market tariff rates. In such cases, the Environmental 
authority generally sets a premium price to be paid for power generated from 
renewables.Some countries (UK, Ireland) developed a so called bidding system schemes in 
whichthe most cost effective offer is selected to receive a subsidy. This last specific case is 
also accounted in the dummy, due to its similarity to the feed-in systems.   
Dummy Variable International Energy Agency 
Feed-in Tariff Guaranteed price that may vary by technology. (Wind, Solar, Ocean, Geothermal, Biomass, 
Waste, Hydro).  
Level of price guaranteed (USD, 
2006 prices and PPP) 
(Dummy Variable  also available) 
International Energy Agency 
Cerveny and Resch (1998) 
Country specific sources 
Voluntary program These programs generally operate through agreement between government, public utilities 
and energy suppliers, that agree to buy energy generated from renewable sources. One of the 
first voluntary program was in Denmark in 1984, when utilities agreed to buy 100MW of 
wind power. 
Dummy Variable International Energy Agency 
Obligations Obligation and targetstake generally the form of quota systems that place an obligation on 
producers to provide a share of their energy supply from renewable energy. These quota are 
not necessarily covered by a tradable certificate. 
Dummy Variable International Energy Agency 
Tradable Certificate Renewable energy Certificates (REC) are used to track or document compliance with quota 
system and can generally be traded in specific markets. As a result, at national level part of 
the total electricity produced generally must either be generated by renewables or covered 
with a renewable energy certificate. 
Share of electricity that must be 
generated by renewables or 
coveredwith a REC. 
Dummy Variable also available. 
Data made available by Nick 
Johnstone, OECD Environment 
Directorate 
Public Research and 
Development  
Public financed R&D program disaggregated by type of renewable energy public sector per capita 
expenditures on energy R&D 
(USD, 2006 prices and PPP).   
(Dummy Variable  also available) 
International Energy Agency 
EU directive 
2001/77/EC 
Established the first shared framework for the promotion of electricity from renewable 
sources at European level. 
Dummy Variable European Commission 
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Table 2. First Principal Component Analysis results 
FACT_AV_FEED 
 
Variables included Eigenvalue Share of variance 
Explained 
First Average Feed-in tariff(Value) 3.633 0.403 
 Tax Measure (Dummy)   
 Investment incentive (Dummy)   
 Voluntary program (Dummy)   
 Incentive tariff (Dummy)   
Second Obligation (Dummy) 1.159 0.128 
 EU Directive 2001 (Dummy)   
 REC target (Value)   
Third Public R&D (Value) 1.0209 0.113 
Table 3. Second Principal ComponentAnalysis results 
FACT_SP_FEED 
 
Variables included Eigenvalue Share of variance 
Explained 
First Feed-in tariff wind(Value) 4.796 0.399 
 Feed-in tariff solar(Value)   
 Feed-in tariffbiomass(Value)   
 Feed-in tariff waste(Value)   
 Incentive tariff (Dummy)   
Second Tax Measure (Dummy) 1.7023 0.141 
 Investment incentive (Dummy)   
 Voluntary program (Dummy)   
 Obligation (Dummy)   
Third EU Directive 2001 (Dummy) 1.191 0.099 
 Obligation (Dummy)   
 REC target (Value)   
Fourth Public R&D (Value) 1.008 0.084 
Table 4. Third Principal ComponentAnalysis results 
FACT_MIX Variables included Eigenvalue Share of variance 
Explained 
First Feed-in tariff wind (Dummy) 6.3606 0.424 
 Feed-in tariff solar (Dummy)   
 Feed-in tariffbiomass (Dummy)   
 Feed-in tariff waste (Dummy)   
 Average Feed-in tariff (Value)   
 Incentive tariff (Dummy)   
Second EU Directive 2001 (Dummy) 2.127 0.141 
 Obligation (Dummy)   
 REC target (Value)   
Third Tax Measure (Dummy) 1.347 0.089 
 Investment incentive (Dummy)   
 Voluntary program (Dummy)   
Fourth Public R&D (Value) 1.124 0.075 
 Public R&D (Dummy)   
Table 5. Correlations among the policy Indicators based on Factors in selected countries 
 FACT_AV_FEED FACT_SP_FEED FACT_MIX 
FACT_AV_FEED 1.0000   
FACT_SP_FEED 0.9639* 1.0000  
FACT_MIX 0.9350* 0.9545* 1.0000 
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Figure 2. FACT_AV_FEED 
 
 
Figure 3. COM_POL 
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Figure 4. CONT_POL 
 
Table 6. Country ranking according to the different indicator. Year 2005 
Ranking FACT_AV_FEEDIN COM_POL COUNT_POL 
1 Denmark 6.427 Japan 3.185 Denmark 8.448 
2 Sweden 3.636 Germany 2.668 Austria 5.436 
3 Austria 3.551 United States 2.668 Sweden 3.634 
4 Netherlands 2.507 Italy 2.668 Portugal 3.402 
5 United Kingdom 2.447 Austria 2.150 Belgium 2.465 
6 Germany 2.179 Belgium 2.150 Netherlands 1.999 
7 Italy 2.150 Canada 2.150 Spain 1.774 
8 Belgium 2.125 Denmark 2.150 Germany 1.745 
9 Finland 1.775 Finland 2.150 Switzerland 1.571 
10 Spain 1.640 Netherlands 2.150 United Kingdom 1.485 
11 Japan 1.590 Norway 2.150 Hungary 1.359 
12 France 1.538 Sweden 2.150 Czech Republic 1.250 
13 Switzerland 1.486 United Kingdom 2.150 Italy 0.550 
14 Luxembourg 1.409 Australia 1.633 Greece 0.437 
15 United States 1.274 France 1.633 Luxembourg 0.418 
16 Australia 1.120 Luxembourg 1.633 France 0.364 
17 Ireland 1.113 Spain 1.633 Australia 0.311 
18 Portugal 0.990 Switzerland 1.633 Japan 0.166 
19 Norway 0.827 Ireland 1.116 Finland 0.138 
20 Czech Republic 0.757 Czech Republic 0.598 United States 0.083 
21 Canada 0.751 Hungary 0.598 Canada -0.214 
22 Greece 0.425 New Zealand 0.598 Norway -0.341 
23 New Zealand 0.300 Portugal 0.598 New Zealand -0.389 
24 Poland 0.022 Greece 0.081 Ireland -0.463 
25 Hungary -0.152 Poland 0.081 Slovak Republic -0.600 
26 Slovak Republic -0.193 Slovak Republic -0.436 Poland -0.600 
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Table 7. Correlations among the policy Indicators based on Factors in selected countries. Years 1970-2005 
 FACT_AV_FEED COM_POL CONT_POL 
FACT_AV_FEED 1.0000   
COM_POL 0.7722* 1.0000  
CONT_POL 0.8584* 0.4938* 1.0000 
Table 8. Correlations among the policy Indicators based on Factors in selected countries. Year 1990 
 FACT_AV_FEED COM_POL CONT_POL 
FACT_AV_FEED 1.0000   
COM_POL 0.7500* 1.0000  
CONT_POL 0.7230* 0.3236 1.0000 
Table 9. Correlations among the policy Indicators based on Factors in selected countries. Year 2005 
 FACT_AV_FEED COM_POL CONT_POL 
FACT_AV_FEED 1.0000   
COM_POL 0.5762* 1.0000  
CONT_POL 0.8492* 0.2339 1.0000 
 
Figure 5. Trend of PMR for selected countries 
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Figure 6. Trend of PMR for selected countries 
 
 
Table 10. Energy Markets before liberalization 
Country Share of DG before liberalization 
Non monopoly system 
before liberalization 
Australia 0 0 
Austria 1 1 
Belgium 0 1 
Canada 0 0 
Czech Republic 1/2 1 
Denmark 2 1 
Finland 0 1 
France 0 0 
Germany 2 1 
Greece 0 0 
Hungary 0 1 
Ireland 0 0 
Italy 0 0 
Japan 0/1 0 
Luxembourg 0 1 
Mexico 0 0 
Netherlands 2 1 
New Zealand 1 1 
Norway 0 1 
Poland 1 1 
Portugal 1 0 
Slovak Republic 0 1 
Spain 1 0 
Sweden 2 1 
Switzerland 0 1 
Turkey 0 1 
United Kingdom 0 0 
UnitedStates 0 0 
DG=Distributed generation, 2 is high share, 0 low 
Monopoly before liberal.: 0 no, 1 yes, shadow: difficult to classify 
Sources: IEA country reviews, IEA 'Lesson from lib. Mkt.' 
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics and Sources 
Acronim Description Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max Source 
FACT_AV_FEEDIN Policy index based on factor analysis (Standardized) 936 0 1 -0.769 6.427  
FACT_SP_FEEDIN Policy index based on factor analysis (Standardized) 936 0 1 -0.778 5.367  
FACT_MIX Policy index based on factor analysis (Standardized) 936 0 1 -1.044 4.267  
COM_POL Policy index based on dummy variables (Standardized) 936 0 1 -0.953 3.184  
CONT_POL Policy index based on continuous variables (Standardized) 936 0 1 -0.600 8.448  
GDP GDP per capita, thousands US 1990 Dollars, ppp. (Missing 
data for Czech and Slovak republic before 1990) 
899 23.272 8.971 6.045 71.16 OECD 
Gini coeff. Gini Coefficient 889 27.571 4.377 15.061 38.72 Standardized World 
Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID) 
Kyoto Dummy Dummy variable that takes on a value of 0 prior to the 
approval of the Kyoto protocol and 1 thereafter  
936 0.25 0.433 0   
Green share of green deputies in the parliament 792 1.311 2.623 0 13.33 World bank 
PMR Electr. (Std) Product Market regulation in the energy sector (Standardized 
in the analysis) 
775 0.4709 0.178 0.074 1 OECD 
Energy Prices Energy end use price, USDppp/unit (Households) 753 0.1085 0.046 0.0190 0.256 International Energy 
agency 
DG before 
Liberalization 
Share of distributed generation before liberalization 936 0.576 0.756 0 2 International Energy 
agency 
PMR Entry Product Market regulation in the energy sector sub-index:   
entry barriers 
798 4.685 2.182 0 6 OECD 
PRM Public Ownership Product Market regulation in the energy sector sub-index:   
Public ownership 
806 4.464 1.821 0 6 OECD 
PMR Vertical 
Integration 
Product Market regulation in the energy sector sub-index:   
Vertical integration 
806 4.719 1.940 0 6 OECD 
Corruption Corruption index that ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 
(highly clean). (Available from 1980) 
676 7.235 1.831 1.497 9.959 World Resource Institute 
dataset 
Higher Education log of % of population aged 15 or over with complete higher 
education 
936 0.1160 0.081 0 0.331 Cohen and Soto dataset 
Political instability Political instability index 721 -0.001 0.455 -3 3 Comparative Political Data 
Set I 
Woman participation share of female deputies in the parliament 776 14.854 11.16 0 45.3 Comparative Political Data 
Set I 
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Table12. Dependent variable: FACT_AV_FEEDIN 
Specification I II (RE) II (FE) III (RE) III (FE) IV V VI VI’  
one year lag GDP 0.0461** 
(0.0194) 
0.0451** 
(0.0209) 
0.0463** 
(0.0208) 
0.0292 
(0.0216) 
0.0196 
(0.0231) 
0.0332* 
(0.0187) 
0.0301** 
(0.0157) 
0.0198* 
(0.0120) 
0.0226 
(0.0235) 
Ginicoeff. -0.0458* 
(0.0263) 
-0.0844** 
(0.0344) 
-0.1142*** 
(0.0373) 
-0.0799** 
(0.0325) 
-0.1111*** 
(0.0344) 
-0.0822*** 
(0.0273) 
-0.0703** 
(0.0309) 
-0.0699** 
(0.0287) 
-0.0436** 
(0.0199) 
Kyoto Dummy 0.9771*** 
(0.2074) 
0.6058*** 
(0.1723) 
0.5069** 
(0.1902) 
0.6097*** 
(0.1593) 
0.5639*** 
(0.1755) 
0.4219** 
(0.1831) 
0.5289*** 
(0.1996) 
0.5216*** 
(0.1884) 
0.5890*** 
(0.1378) 
Green 0.0349 
(0.0369) 
0.0471 
(0.0377) 
0.0449 
(0.0380) 
0.0358 
(0.0390) 
0.0374 
(0.0399) 
0.0282 
(0.0386) 
0.0402 
(0.0378) 
0.0304 
(0.0383) 
-0.0378 
(0.0333) 
PMR Electr. (Std)  -0.4768*** 
(0.1670) 
-0.6429*** 
(0.2126) 
-0.4340*** 
(0.1629) 
-0.6218*** 
(0.1960) 
-0.1955* 
(0.1201) 
   
Energy Prices    5.2821* 
(2.8469) 
5.6067* 
(2.983) 
4.117** 
(1.950) 
 5.3322** 
(2.3563) 
6.0683 
(3.9402) 
DG beforeLiberalization    0.1416 
(0.1783) 
 -0.2083 
(0.2545) 
0.2971** 
(0.1325) 
0.2081 
(0.1422) 
0.1836 
(0.1374) 
Kyoto*PMR      -0.2955** 
(0.1467) 
   
DG bef Lib*PMR      0.2795* 
(0.1533) 
   
PMR Entry       -0.1510*** 
(0.0536) 
-0.149*** 
(0.0534) 
-0.1395*** 
(0.0534) 
PRM Public Ownership       -0.0009 
(0.0549) 
0.0008 
(0.0591) 
-0.0003 
(0.0481) 
PMR Vertical Integration       -0.0076 
(0.0784) 
0.0119 
(0.0773) 
-0.0424 
(0.0743) 
Country FE No No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Area FE Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Trend No No No No No No No No Yes 
Observation 726 634 634 617 617 617 660 643 643 
Hausman test   26.62 (0.000)  28.20(0.000)     
Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country.  *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 13. Dependent variable: FACT_MIX 
Specification I I’ II (RE) II (FE) III IV V VI VI’ 
one year lag GDP 0.0690*** 
(0.0167) 
0.0553*** 
(0.0138) 
0.0510** 
(0.0235) 
0.0548** 
(0.0253) 
0.0336 
(0.0233) 
0.0381** 
(0.0381) 
0.0395*** 
(0.0152) 
0.0286** 
(0.0135) 
0.0200 
(0.0152) 
Ginicoeff. -0.0257* 
(0.0156) 
-0.0142 
(0.0211) 
-0.0449* 
(0.0272) 
-0.0670** 
(0.0304) 
-0.0394* 
(0.0240) 
-0.0381* 
(0.0210) 
-0.0337* 
(0.0199) 
-0.0339* 
(0.0202) 
-0.0124 
(0.015) 
Kyoto Dummy 0.8463*** 
(0.1435) 
0.8408*** 
(0.1217) 
0.6759*** 
(0.1235) 
0.5899*** 
(0.1390) 
0.6746*** 
(0.110) 
0.5697*** 
(0.1148) 
0.6312*** 
(0.1520) 
0.6149*** 
(0.1377) 
0.4949*** 
(0.1334) 
green   0.0473 
(0.0309) 
0.0445 
(0.0310) 
0.0340 
(0.0312) 
0.0254 
(0.0285) 
0.0451 
(0.0311) 
0.0338 
(0.0313) 
-0.0361 
(0.0240) 
PMR Electr. (Std)   -0.32468** 
(0.1301) 
-0.4380** 
(0.1659) 
-0.2703** 
(0.1286) 
-0.1124 
(0.1099) 
   
Energy Prices     6.2667*** 
(1.618) 
5.365*** 
(1.361) 
 6.2837*** 
(1.265) 
4.4830* 
(2.5393) 
DG beforeLiberalization     0.1189 
(0.1208) 
-0.1530 
(0.1587) 
0.3052*** 
(0.1127) 
0.2007* 
(0.1149) 
0.1823** 
(0.0949) 
Kyoto*PMR      -0.1328 
(0.1174) 
   
DG bef Lib*PMR      0.2236** 
(0.0919) 
   
PMR Entry       -0.0931** 
(0.0466) 
-0.0913** 
(0.0456) 
-0.1022*** 
(0.0372) 
PRM Public Ownership       0.0003 
(0.0452) 
0.0038 
(0.0484) 
0.0149 
(0.0435) 
PMR Vertical Integration       -0.0170 
(0.0572) 
0.0059 
(0.0572) 
-0.0202 
(0.0477) 
Corruption  0.0737* 
(0.0409) 
       
Country FE No No No Yes No No No No No 
Area FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Trend No No No No No No No No Yes 
Observation 829 656 634 634 617 617 660 643 643 
Hausman test    27.63 (0.000)      
Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country.  *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 14. Dependent variable: COM_POL 
Specification I (RE)  (FE) II III IV V VI VI’ 
one year lag GDP 0.0715*** 
(0.0213) 
0.0761*** 
(0.0210) 
0.0819*** 
(0.021) 
0.0633*** 
(0.0207) 
0.0506*** 
(0.0186) 
0.03397** 
(0.0148) 
-0.0006 
(0.0104) 
0.0289** 
(0.0113) 
Ginicoeff. 0.0196 
(0.0201) 
0.0164 
(0.0201) 
0.0181 
(0.027) 
0.0199 
(0.0279) 
0.0238 
(0.0257) 
0.0264 
(0.0267) 
0.0107 
(0.0178) 
0.0239 
(0.0302) 
Kyoto Dummy 0.9196*** 
(0.1678) 
0.8896*** 
(0.1649) 
0.7587*** 
(0.135) 
0.7553*** 
(0.1272) 
0.7677*** 
(0.1544) 
0.7735*** 
(0.1320) 
0.5191*** 
(0.1567) 
0.6541*** 
(0.1396) 
Green 0.0379 
(0.0245) 
0.0345 
(0.0243) 
0.0501** 
(0.024) 
0.0429* 
(0.0232) 
0.0533** 
(0.0219) 
0.0436** 
(0.0209) 
0.0009 
(0.0195) 
0.0300 
(0.0207) 
PMR Electr. (Std)   -0.0730 
(0.094) 
-0.0565 
(0.0858) 
    
Energy Prices    5.6178*** 
(1.3486) 
 7.5481*** 
(1.397) 
0.8310 
(2.314) 
5.6569** 
(2.411) 
DG before Liberalization    0.0410 
(0.0821) 
0.2282** 
(0.1033) 
0.0868 
(0.0976) 
0.0535 
(0.0896) 
0.0101 
(0.1043) 
PMR Entry     -0.1036** 
(0.0491) 
-0.1010** 
(0.0460) 
-0.0806** 
(0.0351) 
-0.0813** 
(0.0425) 
PRM Public Ownership     -0.0242 
(0.0455) 
-0.0304 
(0.0440) 
-0.0404 
(0.0333) 
-0.0286 
(0.0497) 
PMR Vertical Integration     0.0641 
(0.0519) 
0.0927* 
(0.0491) 
0.0761* 
(0.0388) 
0.0992** 
(0.0506) 
Corruption        0.0110 
(0.0778) 
Higher Education        5.036** 
(1.9502) 
Political instability        -0.0336 
(0.0956) 
Woman partecipation        0.0215 
(0.0145) 
Country FE No Yes No No No No No No 
Area FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Trend No No No No No No Yes No 
Observation 726 726 634 617 660 643 643 571 
Hausman test  13.81(0.000)       
Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country.  *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 15. Dependent variable: CONT_POL 
Specification I (RE) I  (FE) I’ II III IV V VI 
one year lag GDP 0.0208 
(0.0166) 
0.0293 
(0.0182) 
0.0221 
(0.0206) 
0.0015 
(0.0268) 
-0.0333 
(0.0310) 
-0.0027 
(0.0271) 
0.0002 
(0.0225) 
0.0058 
0.0288 
Ginicoeff. -0.0523* 
(0.0312) 
-0.0717* 
(0.0371) 
-0.0606 
(0.0459) 
-0.1314** 
(0.0528) 
-0.1275** 
(0.048) 
-0.1097* 
(0.0439) 
-0.1093** 
(0.0501) 
-0.0905** 
0.0450 
Kyoto Dummy 0.7076*** 
(0.2185) 
0.6699*** 
(0.2074) 
0.61065*** 
(0.1705) 
0.2922* 
(0.1638) 
0.3673** 
(0.1633) 
0.1770 
(0.1665) 
0.3494** 
(0.157) 
0.5442*** 
0.136 
Green 0.0336 
(0.0464) 
0.0300 
(0.0473) 
0.0369 
(0.0561) 
0.0384 
(0.0498) 
0.0283 
(0.0549) 
-0.0055 
(0.0519) 
0.0435 
(0.0518) 
0.0455 
0.0559 
PMR Electr. (Std)    -0.7665** 
(0.3649) 
-0.7376** 
(0.3572) 
-0.3917** 
(0.1727) 
  
Energy Prices     7.4434* 
(4.2108) 
3.3101 
(3.4392) 
 10.927** 
5.218 
DG before Liberalization       
 
  
DG bef Lib*PMR      0.6624* 
(0.2903) 
  
PMR Entry       -0.071 
(0.051) 
-0.075* 
0.040 
PRM Public Ownership       0.0560 
(0.1217) 
0.0432 
0.1233 
PMR Vertical Integration       -0.1378 
(0.1297) 
-0.1251 
0.1251 
Corruption   0.2428* 
(0.125) 
     
Time Trend        -0.0419 
0.0260 
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area FE Yes No No No No No No No 
Observation 726 726 725 633 617 617 660 643 
Hausman test  18.93(0.000)       
Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country.  *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 16. Robustness 
Specification I II III IV V VI VI VIII IX X 
one year lag GDP 0.0338** 
(0.0167) 
0.0346** 
(0.0173) 
0.0341* 
(0.0205) 
0.0402*** 
0.0139 
0.0413*** 
(0.014) 
0.0448* 
(0.0267) 
0.0032 
(0.0068) 
0.0030 
(0.0049) 
0.0082** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0047 
0.0079 
Ginicoeff. -0.1062*** 
(0.0231) 
-0.1021*** 
(0.0235) 
-0.1026** 
(0.0422) 
-0.0594*** 
0.0161 
-0.0583*** 
(0.0168) 
-0.0538* 
(0.0325) 
-0.0188** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0063 
(0.0071) 
0.0079 
(0.0051) 
-0.0220* 
0.0127 
Kyoto Dummy 0.4912*** 
(0.116) 
0.5185*** 
(0.1241) 
0.5153** 
(0.1919) 
0.5532*** 
0.0963 
0.5598*** 
(0.1003) 
0.5843*** 
(0.1387) 
0.1704** 
(0.0678) 
0.1448*** 
(0.0464) 
0.0888** 
(0.0346) 
0.1010 
0.0811 
Green 0.0543*** 
(0.0166) 
0.0464*** 
(0.0179) 
0.0464 
(0.0429) 
0.0475*** 
0.0153 
0.0443*** 
(0.0157) 
0.0441 
(0.0348) 
0.0126 
(0.0106) 
0.0131* 
(0.0073) 
0.0161** 
(0.0054) 
0.0096 
0.0130 
PMR Electr. (Std) -0.6839*** 
(0.2329) 
-0.6901*** 
(0.2548) 
-0.6989*** 
(0.2368) 
-0.5700*** 
0.167 
-0.5473*** 
(0.180) 
-0.4801** 
(0.1809) 
-0.1099** 
(0.0557)  
-0.0431 
(0.0400) 
0.0349 
(0.0284) 
-0.1404** 
0.0705 
Lag Dependent Variable       0.8765*** 
(0.0309) 
0.9034*** 
(0.0278) 
0.9363*** 
(0.0263) 
0.9247*** 
0.02917 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 545 545 545 545 545 545 613 613 613 613 
F First step 36.89(3,517) 95.30 (1,519)  36.89(3,517) 95.30 (1,519)      
Hansen test 0.2162 0.000  0.1792 95.30      
Dependent Variable FACT_AV_ 
FEEDIN 
FACT_AV_ 
FEEDIN 
FACT_AV_ 
FEEDIN 
FACT_MIX FACT_MIX FACT_MIX FACT_AV_ 
FEEDIN 
FACT_MIX COM_POL CONT_POL 
Instruments Corruption, 
Right Party, 
high Educ 
Corruption RE with area 
dummy 
estimation 
Corruption, 
Right Party, 
high Educ 
Corruption RE with area 
dummy 
estimation 
    
Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country.  *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
In column VI-X we used the stata routine xtlsdvc implemented by Bruno (2005), initializing the bias correction using standard one-step Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator with no intercept, and following Kiviet (1999), 
we forced a bias approximation up to N−1T−2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Francesco Nicolli and  Francesco Vona 
 34
Table 17. Dependent variable: FACT_AV_FEEDIN 
 oneyearlag GDP Ginicoeff. Kyoto 
AllCountries 0.0597*** -0.0336* 0.7981*** 
No Scandinavian 0.0568*** -0.0140 0.6867*** 
No Anglo  0.0626*** -0.0261 0.8718*** 
No Cent EU 0.0724*** -0.0364* 0.5753*** 
No Medierranean 0.0569*** -0.0347 0.8393*** 
No East 0.0562*** -0.0338 0.8839*** 
No Poor 0.0553*** -0.0461** 0.9224*** 
No Denmark 0.0553*** -0.0201 0.7394*** 
No Austria 0.0593*** -0.0360** 0.7545*** 
No Hungary 0.0589*** -0.0347* 0.8224*** 
No UnitedStates 0.0594*** -0.0288 0.8191*** 
Country FE No No No 
Area FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country.  *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Table 18. Dependent variable: FACT_AV_FEEDIN 
 oneyearlag GDP Ginicoeff. Kyoto PMR Electr. (Std) 
AllCountries 0.0548*** -0.0609*** 0.6012*** -0.4019*** 
No Scandinavian 0.0649*** -0.0292** 0.5404*** -0.2217** 
No Anglo  0.0759** -0.0471*** 0.4802*** -0.5381*** 
No Cent EU 0.0366** -0.0610** 0.5451*** -0.4189*** 
No Medierranean 0.0545*** -0.0677*** 0.7020*** -0.3734*** 
No East 0.0485*** -0.0883*** 0.6905*** -0.4889*** 
No Poor 0.0575*** -0.0792*** 0.5900*** -0.4224*** 
No Denmark 0.0511*** -0.0461*** 0.5958*** -0.3277*** 
No Austria 0.0540*** -0.0620*** 0.5906*** -0.3615*** 
No Hungary 0.0520*** -0.0683*** 0.6234*** -0.4383*** 
No UnitedStates 0.0520*** -0.0683*** 0.6234*** -0.4383*** 
Country FE No No No No 
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country.  *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 19. Robustness: interactions Gini*GDP 
Specification I II III IV 
one year lag GDP 0.1851** 
(0.0905) 
0.1643** 
(0.0867) 
0.2211** 
(0.1065) 
0.1100* 
0.0614 
Ginicoeff. 0.0385 
(0.0659) 
0.0549 
(0.0688) 
0.1001 
(0.0814) 
0.0400 
0.0609 
Kyoto Dummy 0.6598*** 
(0.1594) 
0.7205*** 
(0.1145) 
0.4889*** 
(0.1339) 
0.7592*** 
0.1320 
Green 0.0328 
(0.0388) 
0.0358 
(0.0334) 
0.0154 
(0.0507) 
0.0595** 
0.0292 
PMR Electr. (Std) -0.4767*** 
(0.1569) 
-0.3223*** 
(0.1242) 
-0.5375** 
(0.2728) 
-0.0658 
0.0911 
Gini*GDP -0.0048** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0039* 
(0.0023) 
-0.0075** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0009 
0.0019 
Country FE No No No No 
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 634 634 634 634 
Dependentvariable FACT_AV_FEEDIN FACT_MIX COM_POL CONT_POL 
Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country.  *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
 
